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Short

NSC BRIEFING

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PROBLEMS WITH "FAITHFUL" SATELLITES

I. Impact of Hungarian and Polish events on USSR's other Satellites has presented Moscow with new problems--in particular, how to deal with growing popular unrest.

- A. Rumanian unrest as high or higher than anywhere else in ranks of "faithful" Satellites.
- B. Perhaps for this reason, Rumanian regime was selected as co-signer of 3 Dec communique with Moscow.


II. In effect, communique is declaration of present Soviet twofold policy towards "faithful" Satellites.

A. Soviet leaders will keep--at least for present--~~as~~^{to} "window-dressing" of earlier policies--lip service "national sovereignty", and stepped-up economic aid.

B. However, major policy emphasis will now be on increasing "unity" of "socialist camp."

C. Communique shows number of contrasts between Rumania and Poland.

1. Rumanians will have no say, at present, regarding Soviet troops stationed there: troops will remain because of "aggressive" policies of "Western imperialists." (Gomulka, in contrast, won voice for Polish regime at least on movement of Soviet troops within country.)
2. Repayment of certain Rumanian debts was "postponed". (Polish debts were cancelled.)
3. Rumania specifically endorsed the Soviet line on Hungary. (Poland avoided any statement on Soviet intervention.)



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- D. Communiqué shows Moscow's firm support of Gheorghiu-Dej regime; should effectively eliminate any Party hopes that Moscow might encourage significant "liberalization."
- E. Rumanian popular reaction will probably range from dismay to fury.
 - 1. Demonstrations are possible, particularly among students and peasants.
 - 2. US legation feels, however, that popular uprising is unlikely, although "situation bears close watching."

III. Bulgarian leaders, now in Moscow, will probably reach similar agreement.

- A. Present orthodox Bulgarian leadership faces widespread popular unrest and growing discontent within Party.
- B. Central Committee minority agitating for increased independence.
 - 1. Majority of party activists reportedly oppose present leaders.
- C. Also, widespread popular discontent, primarily due to economic failings, exists among workers, students, intellectuals.
- D. French Foreign Office says Bulgaria is "ripe for revolt and likely to be next Satellite to blow up."
 - 1. However, regime leaders taking steps to prevent upheaval.

25X1X6□ 2. [REDACTED] 1,200 recently arrested
and at least one concentration camp reopened.

3. Economic concessions (including 15% to 18% wage boosts) also made recently.

IV. In Albania, renewal of dispute between Soviets and Tito has apparently strengthened confidence of pro-Muscovite leaders.

- A. Yugoslav influence has been the only effective challenge to Albania's present leaders.
 - B. Albanian regime has now resumed its attacks on Tito.
 - 1. On 26 Nov, Party leader labeled Tito "a traitor in hands of imperialists," charged "Tito's path to socialism is path of collaboration with our enemies."
 - 2. Albania has also shot 3 "pro-Titoist" leaders, and Yugoslavs claim that "wave of arrests" is engulfing all opponents of regime.
- V. In Czechoslovakia, Party leaders--ever-faithful to the dictates of Moscow--are now (according to US Embassy Prague) "looking homeward to Stalinism," and outdoing Moscow itself in process.
- A. As symbol of return to harsher measures, Czech leaders have now "rehabilitated" their dead Stalinist hero, Gottwald, after reluctantly and mildly censuring him for "cult-of-personality" sins last spring. ^{Now,} Ceremoniously hail ~~him~~ him as all-wise and all-good.
 - B. Czech leaders have also cracked down on the public--through increased internal security measures and through a vigorous anti-Western press campaign, publicity on arrests of alleged US spies.
 - C. Regime has also repeatedly pledged its soul to Moscow.

- 1. On Soviet troop intervention in Hungary, Premier Siroky said: "All the more, our sympathy is with the Soviet Union and its brave army, which, at the request of the Hungarian government...assisted the Hungarian people in crushing the counter-revolution."

2. Also said: "Czechoslovak-Soviet friendship is so deeply rooted in the hearts of the people that no force on earth can dislodge it."
- D. At the same time, Czech leaders trying to convince public that, economically, Czechs are better off than Poles and Hungarians. They have reduced prices, raised some wages, liberalized pension payments.
- E. As for the public, Czechs have been quiescent ever since last June, when Party cracked down on anti-regime sentiments.
1. Embassy Prague says that Western diplomats there are united in belief that no uprising will come in Czechoslovakia.
- VI. Finally, in East Germany, both Soviet actions and East German leaders' declarations indicate that no relaxation or liberalization is in prospect.
- A. Soviet forces in East Germany are being maintained in high state of readiness, being re-equipped with latest weapons and armor.
- B. USSR has reassumed control of East Germany's borders--suggesting a fundamental Soviet reassessment of East German capabilities and reliability, in light of Hungarian and Polish developments.
1. Soviets have also imposed new harassments on Allied rail and road traffic with Berlin.
- C. Despite claims that reunification is the regime's principal goal, East German leaders have taken no concrete steps, and have steadfastly opposed liberal policies (such as Poland has adopted) which might improve climate for all-German negotiations.

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- D. Among the East German people, hatred of both the Soviet Union and domestic Communism appears to be even more intense, as a result of the Hungarian tragedy.
- E. East German people nonetheless disinclined to act against regime.
 - 1. Are well aware of Soviet capabilities and readiness for quelling disorders.
 - 2. Have vivid memories of failure June '53 uprising.
 - 3. Are increasingly convinced that West would not help, even if West Berlin were threatened.

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